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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND EQUAL
PROTECTION LIMITATIONS ON THE FEDERAL
POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS
John Robert Renner*
Introduction
IT]he individual Indian can reject the entire complex of
special legal relationships. He can for all legal purposes
cease to be an Indian whenever he wants to do so. He can
do this most simply by giving up his tribal membership....
Once an Indian has severed his tribal relations he no longer
comes within the scope of the Federal power to regulate
commerce and make treaties with Indian tribes.
- Felix Cohen'
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA)2
in response to congressional committee findings that state courts were
removing an unwarranted proportion of Indian children from their
families and placing the children in non-Indian environments.3 The
ICWA attempts to remedy the problem by creating exclusive tribal.
jurisdiction over all proceedings involving Indian children residing or
domiciled on a reservation, 4 and by providing for the transfer of
foster care placement and parental rights termination proceedings
involving an "Indian child" from state to tribal court - at the
request of either parent, of an "Indian custodian," or of the child's
tribe.' Additionally, the ICWA requires that state and federal courts
give full faith and credit to tribal court decrees. 6
In cases where the state court retains jurisdiction, the ICWA
* Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice. J.D., 1990, Boalt
Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., 1986, Dartmouth
College.
1. Felix S. Cohen, Indians are Citizens!, 1 AM. INDIAN 12, 13-14 (1944).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-
1963 (1988)).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
4. Id. § 1911(a).
5. Id. § 1911(b).
6. Id. § 1911(d).
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requires that the court apply a special standard of proof before it
can order a placement or termination. 7 When the court does make
an adoptive or foster care placement, the ICWA provides that Indian
environments be given preference.8 The second subchapter of the
ICWA authorizes family service programs on reservations. 9 The ICWA
does not specifically provide funding.
In the 100th Congress, Senator Daniel Evans of Washington intro-
duced legislation (Senate Bill 1976) designed to expand the scope of
the .[CWA.'0 In an effort to increase state compliance with the original
Act and to further decrease the still disproportionately high rate of
Indian parent-child separations, the bill would have changed the
definitions of "child custody proceeding"" and "Indian child,' ' 2
increasing the number of children subject to the ICWA's provisions.
The section of the original Act which allows either parent to object
and block transfer from state to tribal court would have been largely
removed," as would the section that permits a state court to find
"good cause" to deny transfer.' 4 Further, Senate Bill 1976 would
have altered the rules that apply when the state retains jurisdiction.
For example, parental alcohol abuse and "non-conforming social
behavior" would have been, inadequate to justify removal unless the
court finds a "direct causal relationship between the particular con-
ditions and ... serious emotional or physical damage to the child."',
Senate Bill 1976 died in committee at the conclusion of the 100th
Congress in December 1988, and has not yet been reintroduced
(although the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs had sug-
gested that a similar legislative package would be brought before the
101st Congress). 6 However, an examination of Senator Evans' bill
7. Id. § 1912(e) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence" before foster care
placement may be ordered); id. § 1912(f) (requiring evidence "beyond a reasonable
doubt" before parental rights may be terminated).
8. Id. § 1915.
9. Id. §§ 1931-1934.
10. S. 1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in Indian Child Welfare
Act: Hearing before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-45 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hearing]. The bill was cosponsored
by five out of the seven other members of the committee, including the chairman,
Senator Inouye. Senator Evans was the ranking republican member.
11. S. 1976, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(1) (1987). Compare id. with 25 U.S.C. §
1903(1) (1988).
12. S. 1976, § 4(5). Compare id. with 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
13. S. 1976, § 101(b). Compare id. with 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
14. S. 1976, § 101(b).
15. Id. § 102(g).
16. Senator Evans did not run for reelection in 1988. National Desk, Special to
the New York Times: Washington State Picks Senate Foes, N.Y. Tims, Sept. 22,
1988, at A31. The information on the status of Senate Bill 1976 was obtained by
telephone from the committee staff.
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remains useful because it sheds light on existing problems in the
present ICWA, and involves issues that will likely figure in any future
legislation.
Both the ICWA (at least in its early forms when it was worked on
and amended in committee) and Senate Bill 1976 have been criticized
on the grounds that they unconstitutionally deny access to state courts
on the basis of race.' 7 Critics have similarly objected to the standard
of proof requirements and placement preferences.
This comment argues that while the original ICWA was for the
most part an appropriate federal regulation of tribal Indian affairs,
the proposed amendments go beyond tribal Indians to regulate ethnic
Indians in a manner that violates the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment.' 8 Although Congress has broad authority to
regulate Indian affairs, an authority based largely on the Indian
Commerce Clause,19 Congress cannot exercise unlimited power. At
some point in a spectrum, as a law ceases to concern reservations or
Indian tribes and focuses its attention on Indians lacking significant
contacts with these societies, the Equal Protection Clause should limit
the law's scope. We need to reconcile the existence of separate Indian
reservations in our federal system with our legal and societal norms
against racial discrimination. This comment seeks to define the mar-
gin between acceptable regulation of Indian affairs and inappropriate
racial discrimination, in the context of the ICWA.20
Part I provides a background to the constitutional issues raised by
the existing and proposed legislation. Section A examines the consti-
tutional basis for the "plenary" federal power over Indian affairs.
Section B next reviews the historical framework of federal Indian
policy. Section C then discusses the nature of the Indian child sep-
17. Many of the underlying issues were laid out in a dispute between the De-
partment of Justice and the House and Senate committees in 1978 about the consti-
tutionality of earlier versions of the Indian Child Welfare legislation. The relevant
materials are reproduced in the House Report on the ICWA. H.R. REP. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530 [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 1386]. Compare Letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to
the Hon. Morris Udall 35-38 (Feb. 9, 1978) and Letter from the Assistant Attorney
General 38-41 (May 23, 1978), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1386, with H.R. REP. No.
1386, supra, at 12-19. In general, this comment agrees with the position of the
Department of Justice.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
("[T]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive ... discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.").
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. For a related effort in the context of tribal criminal jurisdiction, see Patricia
Owen, Note, Who is an Indian?: Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty
and Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 161.
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aration crisis, explains why the situation provoked a congressional
response, and how it fits into the historical framework. Part II first
examines the most significant Indian "equal protection" cases. The
jurisdictional and substantive provisions of the ICWA are then meas-
ured against the standards that have been set up by the federal
courts. Part III looks at the principal changes between the amended
and original versions of the ICWA to demonstrate that genuine and
substantial constitutional objections have been raised to Senate Bill
1976. Finally, the comment concludes by suggesting that, at least in
the present context, the consent of the affected individual should
ultimately serve as the dividing line between Congress' plenary power
over Indian affairs and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibitions against racial discrimination.
I. Historical Background
This section briefly describes the legal and historical relationship
between the states, the Indian tribes, and the national government
in our federal system. The ICWA and the Indian family crisis that
spawned it are placed within this tripartite regime.
A. "Plenary" Federal Power
The Constitution as adopted in 1789 mentioned Indians only two
times: once where "Indians not taxed" were excluded from federal
representative apportionment; 2' and again, under Congress' enumer-
ated powers - "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." '2 2 The latter
provision has most often been used as the constitutional basis for
congressional regulation of Indian affairs.
Chief Justice John Marshall laid out the extent of this federal
power in the seminal cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia23 and
Worcester v. Georgia.24 In Worcester the Court invalidated a Georgia
statute extending state laws and state jurisdiction over the Cherokee
Nation. Georgia had imprisoned two white missionaries, Samuel
Worcester and Elizur Butler, under a sentence of four years at hard
labor for entering the Cherokee Nation without the consent of the
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (immediately preceding "three fifths of all
other Persons.").
22. Id. § 8, ci. 3.
23. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (denying jurisdiction in the Cherokee Nation's suit
to enjoin the State of Georgia from enforcing its laws within the Nation's boundaries).
24. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969) (a
comprehensive history of the Cherokee cases and of federal Indian policy during the
removal period).
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state authorities. Based in part on his analysis of the history of
Indian relations with Great Britain and later with the United States,
and in part on a comparison of the Constitution with the Articles of
Confederation, 5 the ,Chief Justice concluded that the Constitution
simultaneously delegated broad power over Indian affairs to the
national government, while denying it to the states: "These powers
[the war power, the treaty-making power, and the Indian commerce
power] comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our
intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions
on their free actions. ' 26 The Court relied on this federal preemption
of authority to invalidate the Georgia law.
While President Andrew Jackson (elected as a proponent of Indian
removal) highly criticized the decision,2 7 Marshall's doctrine actually
proved to be a two-edged sword. The President and Congress used
the strong federal power the Court had now endorsed to remove the
Cherokee and the other eastern tribes to territories west of the
Mississippi.23 Language in the Cherokee cases endorsing tribal sov-
ereignty and federal guardianship responsibilities, however, makes it
clear that Marshall would have preferred a very different result.29
Other provisions of the Constitution have, at least in the past,
supplemented the Indian Commerce Clause as a source of federal
authority. Marshall mentioned two: the war power 0 and the Presi-
dent's power to sign treaties. 1 In the first century of the nation's
existence both were significant. The Secretary of War had authority
25. See U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 4 ("The United States in
Congress shall also have the sole and exclusive power of ... regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated. .. ."). Marshall could have found additional support for his view in Tim
FEDERALiST No. 42, at 215 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982) (arguing that the
Constitution was intended to transfer exclusive control of trade with the Indians to
the central government); see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S.(5 Pet.) at 19 ("Intending
to give the whole power of managing those affairs to the government about to be
instituted, the convention conferred it explicitly; and omitted those qualifications
which embarrassed the exercise of it as granted in the confederation.").
26. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
27. Jackson is reported to have stated (probably apocryphally), "John Marshall
has had his decision, now let him enforce it." The Court's decree was never enforced,
although Georgia pardoned the missionaries the following year. Burke, supra note
24, at 525, 530.
28. See, e.g., Laurence H. TRIBE, ANm=Ac CONSTrtONAL LAW 1467-68 (1988).
29. For more direct evidence of Marshall's opposition to removal, see Letter
from John Marshall to Dabney Carr (June 26, 1830), reprinted in 2 JoHN P. KENNEDY,
MEMOIRS OF THE LHE OF WILjm WiRT, ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNrTED STATES
296-97 (1849).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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over Indian affairs from 1786 until 1849, when an act of Congress
transferred the subject to the Department of the Interior.12 Active
fighting between the government and Indians continued until late in
the nineteenth century. 33
Until legislation (of questionable constitutional validity) barred the
practice in 1871 ,'34 much of the national regulation of Indian affairs
tool: place through the medium of executive treaties. In the treaty-
making context, Congress considered an Indian tribe equivalent to a
foreign nation. Such treaties bound, and continue to bind, the states
through the Supremacy Clause.3 By this mechanism, federal power
over Indian tribes vastly increased. Tribes ceded not only territory,
but often the right to govern their own affairs. Except where expressly
repudiated by the federal government, these treaties generally remain
in force. Although the parties who signed these treaties possessed
greatly unequal bargaining power, the courts have never used this
disparity to question their legal force. In Fellows v. Blacksmith, 6
for example, the Court held that a ratified Indian treaty "becomes
the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go behind
it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation, than they
can behind an act of Congress." Nevertheless, courts - as a principle
of construction - generally construe doubtful provisions of treaties
and statutes in favor of the Indians.37 Congress may abrogate these
treaties, 38 subject in some circumstances to Fifth Amendment takings
limitations. 39
Nineteenth-century cases occasionally used national ownership of
the land as a conceptual basis for federal control of Indian affairs.
In United States v. Kagama, the Court found authority for federal
control of criminal acts within Indian Country based on "the own-
32. SAMUEL L. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 38, 53 (1973). See, e.g.,
United States v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700 (D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (Justifying
the confinement of Indians on reservations because "[e]very nation exercises the right
to arrest and detain an enemy alien during the existence of a war, and all subjects
or citizens of the hostile nations are subject to be dealt with under this rule.").
33. The last significant conflict was the battle of Wounded Knee in December
1889. ROBERT M. UTLEY & WiKcoms E. WASHBURN, INDIAN WARS 299-300, 340-41
(1977).
34. Indian Appropriation Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
35. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2; see United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93
U.S. 138, 197-98 (1876).
36. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1856).
37. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 667 (1912).
38. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 & n.29 (1979).
40. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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ership of the country in which the territories are, and the right of
exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the National Government,
and can be found nowhere else."14 1 Forty years earlier, in United
States v. Rogers,42 Chief Justice Roger Taney held that the Cherokee
lands had "been assigned to them by the United States as a place of
domicil for the tribe and they hold with the assent of the United
States, and under their authority. ' 43 This authority was "too firmly
and clearly established to admit of dispute."
The Rogers and Kagama reasoning is - at best - only partially
consistent with earlier statements made by the Court in the Cherokee
cases. Probably the most famous judicial explanation of the status
of the tribes appeared in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unques-
tionable, and heretofore, unquestioned right to lands they
occupy, until the right shall be extinguished by a voluntary
cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy,
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more accu-
rately, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession
when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are
in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
45
In the same vein, the Chief Justice argued in Worcester v. Georgia
that European titles in the New World conferred no more than an
exclusive right to purchase land from the native inhabitants. 46 Perhaps
because of its faintly circular quality - how can the national gov-
ernment gain title to the land without first having established sov-
ereignty over its original inhabitants? - the territorial-ownership
theory of federal power is rarely mentioned today.
Marshall's "guardian-ward" reasoning, however, remains a central
justification for federal control. Justice William Brennan, in dicta in
Baker v. Carr,47 cited Marshall's "state of pupilage" as the basis for
the unique status of Indian tribes in our governmental system. More
41. Id. at 380.
42. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id.
45. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
46. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-45 (1832).
47. 369 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1961).
No. 1]
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recently, in Morton v. Mancari,41 the Court held that there is "a
plenary power of congress, based on a history of treaties and the
assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf of
federally recognized Indian tribes. '49 This line of reasoning - at
least implicitly - is a limitation as well as a source of federal power.
Presumably, actions designed to harm tribal Indians could not be
justified as taken pursuant to a power to protect a dependant people."s
The aggregate of these powers has been described as "the creation
of a new power, a power to regulate Indians." 51 As in Morton, this
authority is often defined by courts and commentators as "plenary."
While this authority finds its constitutional origin in the Indian
Commerce Clause, the courts have effectively supplemented this pro-
vision from both within and without the text of the Constitution.
This supplementation partly explains why, while the reach of federal
power under the interstate commerce clause has expanded substan-
tially over the last two hundred years, 52 the reach of the Indian
Commerce Clause expanded far more dramatically, with the growth
occurring in an earlier time period. At least one limitation to this
authority exists, however. The power can only be applied to "Indi-
ans.'"
What powers over Indian affairs remain in the hands of the Indian
tribes and the states? An Indian tribe, at least in theory, retains all
sovereign powers which Congress has not chosen to take away from
it. A tribes' powers are thus not delegated by Congress, but arise
from an inherent sovereignty, (analogous in some ways to that of a
state), that predates the existence of the federal union.54 Justice John
Marshall expressed this view,"5 and the Court affirmed it in later
48. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
49. Id. at 551. The ICWA relies partly on this "guardian-ward" reasoning to
justify the Congressional regulation. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988) (congressional
findings).
50. In fact, Morton does require that "the special treatment ... be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." Morton, 417
U.S. at 555; see also United States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976) (holding that a federal law mandating a higher
penalty for assault for a reservation Indian than would apply to non-Indians on the
reservation violates equal protection).
51. William Gorham Rice, Jr., The Position of the American Indian in the Law
of the United States, 16 J. CoM. LEO. 78, 81 (1934).
52. See, e.g., Letter from Gerald Gunther to the Department of Justice (June 5,
1963), reprinted in GERALD GUNTHER, CoNsTrrTIONAL LAW 163 (1985) (discussing
the commerce power and the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
53. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
54. See FELiX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAx LAW 122 (1942 ed.).
55. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) ("The Cherokee
Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of Congress.").
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cases.5 6 In Worcester, the Court envisioned the Cherokees as holding
their "right of self-government under the guarantee and protection"
of the national government . 7 As a consequence of tribal courts'
independent sovereignty, the Bill of Rights or other federal restric-
tions generally do not limit tribal courts,58 although - at least on
some issues - court decisions have gone the other way.5 9 At the
same time, the external sovereignty of the tribes has been severely
constrained. State courts have exercised jurisdiction over disputes
between non-Indians occurring on a reservation, and have heard suits
by reservation Indians against outsidersA6
Tribal authority is often enhanced by congressional delegations of
specific powers, in a sense restorations of powers that had previously
existed, in accord with federal policies designed to promote reserva-
tion self-government. The ICWA is one example. Thus, for any
exercise of tribal jurisdiction, it may be appropriate to ask if the
jurisdiction is based on the tribes' inherent sovereignty or on a federal
delegation of specific authority.
While the Cherokee cases virtually precluded state control over
Indian affairs, absent a delegation of authority from Congress, more
recent events have changed the situation in some respects. On one
hand, during the 1950s Congress transferred a good deal of its control
over reservations to the state governments. Public Law 28061 accom-
plished this transfer by extending the civilized criminal jurisdiction
of several states over reservations within their boundaries. Moreover,
in Williams v. Lee, 62 the Supreme Court reformulated the Worcester
rule which had excluded states from control of Indian affairs. State
actions are now invalid, "absent governing Acts of Congress," only
if "the state action infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." '63 This "infringement
test" has apparently yet to result in any significant change in the
56. See, e.g., Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1883); United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-606 (1915). But see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220
(1958).
57. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
58. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (Fifth Amendment does not
apply.).
59. See In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alaska Cir. 1886) (tribes may not hold
slaves).
60. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1958).
61. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (including California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). See generally Russel L. Barsh,
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HAST. L.J. 1287, 1301
n.87 (1980).
62. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
63. Id. at 220.
No. 1]
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state-reservation relationship." In any case, these judicial rules gov-
erning state-Indian relations are generally not relevant where Congress
has expressly spoken - as is the case with the ICWA.
B. Federal Indian Policy
The ICWA represents an Indian policy at odds with itself. For
most of the last two hundred years two competing conceptions have
struggled for primacy. One view holds that Indians should be en-
couraged to assimilate into the dominant Western, "white" society.
The other view aims to encourage the preservation of a distinct
Indian culture, and to preserve the tribes and their reservations as
separate, self-governing institutions. While one or the other of these
views has tended to predominate during alternating time periods,
often the two themes hopelessly intertwine and neither has ever
completely crowded out the other.65 The ICWA, primarily a product
of the "separatist" view, was designed to enhance Indian self-deter-
mination and autonomy.66
At the outset of the new republic, Congress intended the goal of
Indian policy primarily to be to assimilate and "civilize" the native
population. Thomas Jefferson perhaps became the most prominent
figure in formulating early federal Indian policy, from 1789 until the
onset of removal in the late 1820s. 67 Jefferson's idea, by no means
a new one, was to convert the Indians into agriculturalists and provide
them with the rudiments of a Western education. 6s Accordingly, an
1819 statute provided "for introducing among [the Indians] the habits
and arts of civilization, . . . to instruct them in the mode of agri-
culture suited to their situation; and for teaching their children in
reading, writing, and arithmetic .... " 69 Teaching the Indians agri-
cultural techniques had the fortunate and deliberate consequence of
64. See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1469; Robert Ericson & D. Rebecca Snow,
Comment, The Battle for Indian Self-Determination, 58 CAL. L. REv. 445, 472-81
(1970) [hereinafter Indian Self-Determination].
65. See TYLER, supra note 32, passim; Indian Self-Determination, supra note 64,
at 446.
66. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988) (congressional findings); id. § 1902 (congressional
declaration of policy).
67. See BERNAM SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION 3-12 (1973). Jefferson was
known for the observations on Indian culture contained in chapter XI of his NoTsS
ON THE STATE OF VnGNIA, published in 1787.
• 68. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Brother Handsome Lake (Nov.
3, 1802), reprinted in MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 305-
07 (1975); see also 'Wicom E. WAsHraulR, RED MAN'S LAND / WHITE MAN'S LAW:
A STUY.y OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 61 (1971)
(quoting statements by President Jefferson urging assimilation on a visiting Indian
delegation).
69. Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516. Chief Justice Marshall relied on
this act as evidence of the intent of Congress to preempt state control of Indian
tribes. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832); see also TYLER, supra
note 32, at 45.
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reducing the Indians' need for land, thus freeing up territory for
white settlement. 70 The reduction of Indian land holdings, along with
the protection of frontier settlements from Indian raids, were con-
sistent and primary policy objectives until the early twentieth century.
The emphasis of Indian policy shifted from assimilation to sepa-
ration with the onset of removal in the late 1820s. 71 This effort to
transplant Indian tribes from the populous East to a newly created
Indian Country west of the Mississippi was closely associated with
the presidency of Andrew Jackson,72 although the idea had originally
been considered by President Jefferson, and Presidents James Monroe
and John Quincy Adams at least nominally supported it.3 Ironically,
the very success of the earlier efforts at assimilation had created a
more sedentary society and thus increased Indian attachment to their
lands making the policy more difficult to implement.7 4 As the west-
ward movement of the frontier soon engulfed these areas, removal
to Indian Country did not prove to be a permanent and viable
solution. A new policy of separation took place during the 1850s,
1860s, and 1870s, with the concentration of Indians into reservations
within the former Indian Country. 75
The General Allotment Act of 1887 (GAA)76 marked a swing back
to an purely assimilationist framework. The idea was to divide the
reservations into parcels of 80 and 160 acres, and turn them over to
individual Indians for cultivation. The federal government would
hold the allotments in trust for the individual Indian for twenty-five
years, after which time the Indians would receive full title.77 Indians
70. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Brother Handsome Lake, supra note
68, at 306-307. The revocation following the Revolutionary War of the British "Proc-
lamation of 1763," which had confined the colonialists east of the Appalachians, had
unleashed a tide of encroachment on Indian lands. At least one historian has listed
the Proclamation of 1763 - in a sense a separatist policy - as an underlying cause
of the American Revolution. Jom C. MILLER, OaiorNs oF TmE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION
75-77 (1959).
71. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. Elected in 1828, and reelected in 1832.
73. Jefferson had proposed a constitutional amendment to authorize Indian
removal as early as 1803. TYLER, supra note 32, at 54. Monroe and Adams supported
removal, on the condition that removal be voluntary. Burke, supra note 24, at 504,
506. See also SAMUEL E. MORRISON, TnE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERIcAN PEOPLE
445-46 (1965). The brutality of removal as actually carried out against the Cherokees
is well described in TRIB , supra note 28, at 1467-68.
74. Burke, supra note 24, at 503; UTLEY & WASHBURN, supra note 33, at 139.
75. This concentration policy could quite legitimately be viewed as simply a step
in an overall policy of assimilation, as it was easier to "civilize" the Indians once
they were confined on reservations. See UTLEY & WASHBURN, supra note 33, at 193.
76. Dawes Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-416j (1988)).
77. Id. §§ 1, 3 (congressional amendments and executive orders later extended
this time period); see 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988) and references following; 25 U.S.C. §
462 (1988); TYLER, supra note 32, at 96.
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who completed this process became citizens. The GAA provided that
these Indians:
[S]hall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both
civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they
may reside; and no Territory shall pass or enforce any law
denying any such Indian within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law. And every Indian ... who has
voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence sep-
arate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has
adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to
be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the
rights privileges, and immunities of such citizens .... 71
Undoubtedly, many of the proponents of allotment were sincerely
interested in the well-being of the Indians.79 At the same time, it is
significant that the Allotment Act contained a provision that allowed
the Secretary of the Interior to purchase and sell off "surplus" tribal
lands. 0 Indian landholdings declined substantially during the allot-
ment period."'
The end of the allotment era and a shift back to a separatist policy
came with the "Indian New Deal" under the Roosevelt administra-
tion. The new administration ended allotment, increased tribal land-
holdings, strengthened tribal institutions, and deliberately fostered
Indian culture and languages. 2 Designed to shift authority towards
self-governing tribes organized under new constitutions, the Wheeler-
Howard Indian Reorganization Act 3 became the legislative center
piece. The economic viability and independence of the reservations
were increased.
Just two decades later, however, the policy reversed and the goal
became "termination" of federal supervision of the tribes as inde-
78. Id. § 6. See United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916) for the judicial gloss
on this section. See also infra text accompanying notes 141-57.
79. But consider the following statement by a contemporary allotment proponent:
"The Indians should be treated in just the way that we treat the white settlers. Give
each his little claim; if, as would generally happen, he declined this, why, then let
him share the fate of thousands of white hunters and trappers who have lived on the
game that the settlement of the country has exterminated, and let him, like these
whites, perish from the face of the earth.. . ." TmonoRE ROOSEVELT, HUNTINO Tan's
OF A RANcHmN 19 (1885). The future President was later known as a reformer of
the Indian Service. EDmuND Moams, Tn RisE OF TnoDoRE ROOsEvELT 454-55 &
n.124 (1979).
80. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (the Dawes Act).
81. WAsHBuRN, supra note 68, at 75 (a reduction from 138 million acres in 1887
to 48 million acres in 1934).
82. See generally TYLER, supra note 32, at 125-50.
83. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
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pendent political entities.14 The Eisenhower administration's policies
were embodied in House Concurrent Resolution 108:
[I]t is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to
make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United
States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other
citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards
of the United States, and to grant them all the rights and
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship. 5
The Resolution included a list of tribes recommended for termination.
In accord with Resolution 108, Congress passed Public Law 280,86
extending the jurisdiction of selected states over Indian Country.
Some tribes actually were terminated.8 7 This was assimilation par
excellence.
But by the late 1960s the policy again shifted - with the beginning
of the present period. The new emphasis was and remains on tribal
self-determination. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 19688 revised
Public Law 280, making tribal consent a necessary element for the
assumption of state jurisdiction 9 and expressly recognizing tribal
powers of self-government.9 Other elements of the 1968 legislation,
including the creation of a statutory bill of rights applicable to tribal
governments, 91 and allowing review by a federal court on a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, 92 are neither clearly separatist nor clearly
assimilationist. The provisions do, however, manifest a commitment
to the continued existence of the reservation system. Both Presidents
84. The underlying trend back to an assimilationist policy dates back to the early
1940s. See, e.g., Carl Carmer, Editorial, We Need a Wise Policy of Assimilation, 4
Am. INWDIAN 2 (1948); William E. Warne, Editorial, The Public Share in Indian
Assimilation, 4 id. at 3.
85. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. 132 (1953).
86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)). See
also supra note 61.
87. Indian Self-Determination, supra note 64, at 460 n.124 (proceedings com-
menced against the Menominee, Klamath, Paiute et al.).
88. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1341 (1988)).
89. Id. §§ 401-406, 82 Stat. at 78-80.
90. Id. § 201, 82 Stat. at 77.
91. Id. § 202, 82 Stat. at 77-78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988)). The bill
of rights contains, inter alia, an equal protection provision: "No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall ... (8) deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or
property without due process of law. . . ." Id. § 202(8), 82 Stat. at 77.
92. Id. § 203, 82 Stat. at 78.
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Johnson and Nixon publicly endorsed tribal self-determination,93 and
no substantial change in this essentially separatist policy has occurred
through the Bush administration. Nevertheless, there have been ten-
sions between some relatively conservative executive branch appoint-
ees, who may lean towards an assimilationist viewpoint, and the
congressional committees, which seem more sympathetic towards tribal
autonomy.94
C. The Indian Child Separation Crisis
Testimony before congressional committees in 1974, 1977, and 1978
documented the existence of a crisis in the Indian family and in its
relationship with the state courts.93 The problem is two-fold. On one
hand, judicial decisions to remove children from their families be-
cause of parental abuse or neglect occur at a disproportionately high
rate among Indian families. At the same time, most adoptive and
foster care placements of these children have been with non-Indian
families - thus, effectively removing the children from Indian so-
ciety.
The statistics are impressive. In 1976 a task force of the American
Indian Policy Review Commission found that 25% to 35% of all
Indian children were being raised by non-Indians in homes and
institutions. 96 The 1977 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs confirmed a figure of at least 25%. 91 These two
numbers do, however, include children enrolled in off-reservation
boarding schools - schools which are properly a separate subject
unto themselves, although many of the issues overlap with those
found in child custody and adoption. In particular, courts often place
children in boarding schools as a means of providing substitute care
93. See President Johnson's Special Message to Congress (Mar. 6, 1968), in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES PoLIcY 248 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1975) [hereinafter
PRUCIA]; President Nixon's Special Message on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), re-
printed in PRUCHA, supra, at 256.
94. See, e.g., infra note 237 (describing a disagreement between former Secretary
of the Interior Donald Hodel and the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs);
infra note 110 (describing a disagreement between Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs Ross Swimmer and the same Senate committee in their appraisal of conditions
on reservations).
95. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter 1977
Hearing]; Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974).
96. AMERicAN INrDiAN Poucy REVIEW ComussioN, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE,
AND TP AL JURISDicTcoN 79 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 1976 REPORT].
97. 1977 Hearing, supra note 95, at 1; Barsh, supra note 61, at 1287, 1290 n.15.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/7
COMMENTS
away from the reservations.98 Indian children were in the early 1970s
roughly six times more likely to be placed in foster care, and nearly
four times more likely to be adopted, than were non-Indian children. 99
When adoptions were ordered, between 75% and 93% of the children
were placed with non-Indian families. 100
Various commentators have attempted to explain this crisis and to
document its relation to federal Indian policies. The Task Force of
the American Indian Policy Review Commission had this to say:
One of the most pervasive components of the various
assimilation or termination phases of American policy has
been the notion that the way to destroy Indian tribal
integrity and culture, usually justified as "civilizing Indi-
ans," is to remove Indian children from their homes and
tribal settings. This effort began in earnest in the 1880's
when Indian children were removed from their homes and
sent to distant boarding schools.' 0'
The Commission found the current problem with child separations
to result from an outgrowth of the continuation of past assimilationist
policies. 0 2 Courts force children - in effect - to assimilate into
non-Indian society via removal and placement proceedings in state
court. 0 1 This need not be done intentionally. In the Commission's
theory, ignorance of Indian lifestyles on the part of non-Indian social
workers and state judges leads to culturally inappropriate child place-
ment decisions.' ° 4 Bias would have the same effect. 05
98. 1976 REPORT, supra note 96, at 179.
99. These numbers are calculated from data compiled in Barsh, supra note 61,
at 1288 n.14. This information in turn was collected by the Association of American
Indian Affairs and reported in the 1977 Hearing, supra note 95, at 538, 603. The full
state-by-state report of the Association is available in the 1976 REPORT, supra note
96, at 177-242.
100. 1976 REPORT, supra note 96, at 182, 189, 211, 220. Only four states reported
this figure: Alaska (93%); California (92%); Montana (87%); and North Dakota
(75%).
101. 1976 REPORT, supra note 96, at 78-79.
102. Id. at 79-80. The essays collected in STEVEN UNGER, THE DESTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN FAMiLIEs (1977) provide compelling support for this view.
103. See Abourezk, The Role of the Government: A Congressional View, in
UNOER, supra note 102, at 12 ("Up to now, however, public and private welfare
agencies seem to have operated on the premise that most Indian children would be
better off growing up non-Indian.").
104. Id. at 80.
105. See generally Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Re-
appraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887,
888-89 (1975) (discussing the possibility of "class or cultural bias" in removal deci-
sions).
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Critics frequently cite two factors as playing a role in mistaken
placement decisions. First, courts lack an understanding of the Indian
extended family, 1'6 and second, courts exaggerate the problem of
Indian alcoholism. 0 7 For example, social workers might treat leaving
a child with relatives outside the nuclear family as neglect, without
considering the differing, though legitimate, practices of Indian fam-
ilies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that these factors alone
could account for the substantially higher rates of neglect determi-
nations among Indian families. The Association on American Indian
Affairs has suggested additional causes. These causes include: vol-
untary waivers obtained under varying forms of duress; the existence
of financial incentives to secure children for adoption; termination
proceedings in which parents do not know their rights and have no
attorney; the use of family poverty as grounds for removal; the poor
quality of state social workers; and the lack of funding for tribal
family service programs. 08 When taken together these factors add up
to a substantial problem.
At the same time, one should bear in mind that the general standard
used in custody determinations is "the best interests of the child:"'0 9
Such a subjective standard does open up the possibility for culturally
biased decisions by a state court. But one should not use this fact
to deny the existence of genuine problems in Indian societies. Res-
ervation populations suffer from poverty, alcoholism, family disin-
tegration, unusually high birth rates, and "cultural disorientation.""10
Urban Indians suffer from many of the same problems that other
106. See William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Families, in UNOaR,
supra note 102, at 3 (much of this article is reproduced in the background statement
of H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 10-12).
107. Compare Joseph Westermeyer, "The Drunken Indian". Myths and Realities,
in UNGER, supra note 102, at 22 with the materials cited infra note 110.
108. Byler, supra note 106, at 4-7; see also Barsh, supra note 61, at 1292-1303.
109. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 105, at 900 n.74 (describing the historical
development of the best interests standard); In re Robert T v. Devon T, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 168, 174 (1988) (an application of the "best interests" standard under the Act).
110. See Byler, supra note 106, at 6-7. The head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has recently stated that "we see cases on a regular basis of child abuse" and that
"the family structure on [the] reservation ... is now in danger of being lost totally
because of alcoholism and - [cut-off by the Chairman]." Statement of Ross Swimmer,
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, in 1988 Hearing,
supra note 10, at 50-51. Assistant Secretary Swimmer's testimony is starkly at odds
with much of the recent academic literature in its portrayal of conditions on reser-
vations. But see WASHBURN, supra note 68, at 234-37 (describing alcohol problems
on reservations); Theodore D. Graves, Acculturation, Access, and Alcohol In a Trt-
Ethnic Community, 69 AM. ANTHRoPOLOGisT 306-21 (1967) (same). See generally U.S.
But ai OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION vol. 1, ch. D, pt. 1, tbl. 2
(1980) (Detailed Population Characteristics, United States Summary) (Subject Report,
American Indians) (raw economic and social statistics) [hereinafter 1980 CENSUS].
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poor inner-city minorities face."' Admittedly, removing children in
many cases will likely accelerate the breakup of Indian families, and
thus feed back into the problems faced by reservation societies.
Poverty alone should not serve as grounds for removal.1 2 Neverthe-
less, some proportion of these removals could reflect the best interests
of the individual child, even if they lie contrary to native American
interests in preserving their own reservations. The same may be true
of decisions to place removed children with more stable, wealthy,
non-Indian families, at least in situations where the court cannot find
suitable Indian homes."' To the extent that the Indian child welfare
crisis arises from reservation social problems rather than mere pro-
cedural shortcomings, state or federal legislators will have great
difficulty finding solutions.
In any event, the ICWA reflects a congressional judgment that
dismantling a society by forcibly removing its children is unaccept-
able. The Act deals with the problem, whenever possible, simply by
transferring the cases to tribal court. Such a shift in responsibility
should prove helpful, and accords with governing assumptions that
tribal Indians can better run their own affairs through autonomous
political reservations. At the same time, a tension exists between the
two separate goals of the ICWA; "to protect the best interests of
Indian children," and "to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes." 4 This tension and the problems that can result from it
become more stark in the consideration of the proposed amendments,
Senate Bill 1976.
II. Equal Protection and the ICWA
A. Due Process and Equal Protection
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
111. See David Null, In Re Junious M.: The California Application of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 75, 85-86 (1984) (arguing that the Act should not be
applied to urban Indians).
112. See Areen, supra note 105, at 910-11, 926, 930-31 (arguing that the existence
of family poverty should not suffice for a finding of parental neglect).
113. A child, however, may generally be better off when placed with a family that
matches that child's ethnic and cultural origin. This is the official position of the
National Committee For Adoption. See Testimony of the National Committee for
Adoption, William L. Pierce, Ph.D., 1988 Hearing, supra note 10, at 184. The subject
of same race versus mixed race adoptions is an unsettled field.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (congressional declaration of policy). Compare id.
with S. 1976, § 3. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 34 n.3 (1989) (quoting statements by the 1978 Act's congressional sponsors); id.
at 49 ("Congress was concerned not solely about the interests ofIndian children and
families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of
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States and of the state wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'"
Until quite recently, very few cases explicitly addressed the question
of equal protection or due process limitations on the power of the
federal government to pass laws singling out tribal or ethnic Indians
for special treatment. The issue can be divided into two components:
(1) who qualifies as an Indian so as to be subject to special con-
gressional regulation of Indian affairs; and (2) what are the limits
on what can be done to those Indians who qualify? The early cases
occasionally raise these issues in other contexts, without expressly
mentioning equal protection. Moreover, only a single Supreme Court
case has overturned an act of Congress regulating Indian affairs on
anything resembling equal protection grounds, and the Court over-
ruled that case just eleven years later." 6 Nevertheless, it is possible
to derive certain rules from the existing cases.
The texts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not in
themselves reveal much. Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that congressional representatives shall be apportioned by
population - "excluding Indians not taxed." From this one might
at least infer that Congress did not intend the amendment to eliminate
the special status of tribal Indians, or to destroy Congress' power
over Indian affairs (at least over those Indians "not taxed"). Beyond
that, the language remains indeterminate.
The legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend that
section one should directly alter the status of tribal Indians in Amer-
ican society." 7 Although the first section of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, the statutory precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment, origi-
nally qualified its definition of "citizen" with the "excluding Indians
not taxed" phrase," 8 no such qualification appears in the crucial first
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[No
person" shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Id. amend. V. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
116. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled by United States v. Nice 241 U.S.
591 (1916).
117. See generally WiLIm E. NELsoN TBE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
PoLrrTCAL PRINCIPLE TO Junctm DOCTRINE 102-04 (1988).
118. Civil Rights Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). The 1870 reenactment of the 1866 Act substituted the
phrase "within the jurisdiction of the United States" for the limiting language,
including the "Indians not taxed" phrase, contained within the 1866 version. See San
Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 13 F. 145, 151 (D. Calif. Cir. 1882).
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section of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The Senate floor debates
make clear that the Senate did not intend the omission to have
substantive impact." 9
Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Judiciary Committee
and the primary author of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, had inserted
the phrase into the Civil Rights Act (Senate Bill 61) to insure that
citizenship would not be extended to encompass
the wild Indians who do not recognize the Government of
the United States at all, who are not subject to our laws,
with whom we make treaties, who have their own regu-
lations, [and] whom we do not pretend to interfere with
or punish for the commission of crimes one upon the
other .... 120
Senator James Doolittle concurred, believing that the distinction
between Indians taxed and not taxed was "fundamental" and rec-
ognized "[f]rom time immemorial," embodying the difference be-
tween traditional and assimilated individuals.121 All Senators speaking
agreed that tribal Indians were not prepared for the rights and
obligations of citizenship.
Four months later, during the Senate debates on the proposed
constitutional amendment, Senator Trumbull changed his position.
He no longer considered the "not taxed" language as a limitation
on citizenship appropriate. He feared the phrase shaded of a property
qualification, and believed that independent, tribal Indians were not
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in any case, and thus
would not be embraced within the scope of the proposed section one
(which used the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" as its
qualifier on the definition of citizen).22 Senator Doolittle, who be-
lieved that such Indians were in fact subject to federal jurisdiction,
still wished to add the "Indians not taxed" language to emphasize
that tribal Indians would not be covered. Although Doolittle's pro-
posed amendment to insert the "Indians not taxed" language lost by
a ten to thirty vote, those senators who voted against the limitation
apparently did so in the belief that tribal Indians were already
119. In any event, it should be noted that the Equal Protection Clause is directed
to "any person," not to "any citizen." Thus, it is not clear that the citizenship
definition is directly relevant to the latter clause, even though they appear in the same
section. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoR ArY OF CONSENT 40-41, 45-
54 (1975) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of citizenship is largely
irrelevant to other constitutional provisions).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull's remarks,
Jan. 31, 1866).
121. Id. at 571 (Sen. Doolittle's remarks, Feb. 1, 1866); see also id. at 572 (Sen.
Trumbull's remarks further defining "Indians not taxed").
Inq1 7.,, -1 q0A o n "A __ I. . 1. . t.- 1___ ... 1U_ 0'L^ --. AN.,~. 1JA 1o C:C
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excluded by the jurisdictional language."- 3 The Senate, in 1866, did
not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment would directly alter the
status of tribal Indians in the United States.
Thus, one must apparently distinguish tribal Indians from assimi-
lated Indians in applying the Fourteenth Amendment's section one
limitations. But first and perhaps more significantly, it remains to
determine to what extent section one of the Fourteenth Amendment,
either in its own right or by means of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, acts as a limitation on the power of the federal
government. Taken at face value, the Fourteenth Amendment only
limits state regulation.
A: least since the time of the Second World War Japanese-intern-
ment cases, however, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed
equal protection restrictions on racial discrimination as incorporated
within the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and thus as limiting
the federal government. This assumption underlies the discussion in
Hirabayashi v. United States-4 and Korematsu v. United States, "-5
which upheld the internment orders, and was brought out more
explicitly in the Korematsu dissents."26 A decade later, a unanimous
Court in Boiling v. Sharpe27 quoted with approval dicta from a late
nineteenth-century case to the effect "that the Constitution of the
United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political
rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or
by the states, against any citizen because of his race.""-2 More
recently, in 1981, a majority of the Court stated that "neither Con-
gress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." 29
The only real dispute on the Court has been over the standard to
be applied to Congress in cases involving preferential treatment of
racial minorities. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,-0 the Court's
latest pronouncement on the issue, a five-justice majority accepted
the promotion of broadcast diversity as a sufficient interest to justify
a racial preference. The majority applied an intermediate standard
123. Id. at 2897.
124. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
125. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
126. See id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
127. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (invalidating school desegregation in the District of
Columbia).
1211. Id. at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896)).
129. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1981) (5-4
decision) (opinion of the Court by O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens, J.J.). No reasoning justifying this conclusion was offered, either in the
opinion itself or in the cases cited therein.
130. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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of scrutiny,' but would only apply this deferential standard to
"benign race-conscious measures mandated by congress.' ' 32 The four
dissenting justices 33 would have applied standard strict-scrutiny anal-
ysis. This dissent stated specifically that "[t]he Constitution's guar-
antee of equal protection binds the Federal Government as it does
the States, and no lower level of scrutiny applies to the Federal
Government's use of race classifications."' 134
Significantly, no current member of the Court has expressed any
support for Judge Robert Bork's recent suggestion that equal pro-
tection limitations should be read to apply exclusively to the state
governments, leaving the federal government unrestricted.13 Under
Bork's analysis, the Court would thus, presumably, overrule Boiling.
John Hart Ely has advanced a similar opinion, although he would
leave the Ninth Amendment as a possible out, serving as an alter-
native means of applying equal protection limitations or restrictions
against the federal government. 3 6 While these suggestions may be
consistent with an original-understanding-based interpretation of the
Constitution, they lie contrary to existing precedent and the Court
does not appear likely to adopt them. For the present, we may
reasonably conclude that federal government discriminations outside
the "benign" category will fall victim to the strict-scrutiny test: the
regulation must be "necessary to the accomplishment of some per-
missible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which
it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate."' 37 The
basic fact of the application of the Equal Protection Clause to the
federal government seems to be settled law.
As to the distinction between tribal and assimilated Indians, a 1879
district court decision, United States v. Crook,3 ' held that an indi-
vidual may sever his or her tribal ties, assimilate into the general
society, and escape the reach of the federal Indian power. The context
was a writ of habeas corpus filed by twenty-five Ponca Indians,
seeking their release from confinement on a reservation. The court
found that the Indian had a "God-given right to withdraw from his
tribe and forever live away from it, as though it had no further
existence."' 3 9 Although Crook is infrequently cited and higher courts
131. Id. at 3008-09 (holding that the governmental action must be substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective).
132. Id. at 3008-09 & n.12.
133. O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, J.J.
134. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAw 83-84 (1990).
136. Jom H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT 32-33 (1980).
137. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
138. F. Cas. 695 (D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891).
12 0 TA .,4000
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have not directly followed it, the case represents a view in accord
with that of leading Indian law commentators. 140 It may well be that
similar cases have rarely arisen because the federal government has
historically pursued policies favoring, rather than restricting, Indian
assimilation.
The Courts' early twentieth-century decisions in In re Heff 41 and
in United States v. Nice,142 which overruled Hef!, merit examination.
Heff, an interpretation of section six of the Dawes Allotment Act of
1887,143 held that Congress, by its own actions, had removed allottee
Indians from the scope of the federal Indian power. While the Court
conceded that "it is for Congress to determine when and how that
relationship shall be abandoned,"' 4 the Court would not allow Con-
gress to revoke "the privileges of citizenship" once these privileges
had been granted. 14 Thus, in Hef, the Court would not apply a
1897 federal law prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians to allot-
ment recipients living off the reservation.
This result followed not because the 1897 Act directly violated the
individual Indian's due process rights, but because, once the individ-
ual fell outside the scope of the federal Indian power, the federal
government lost its constitutional authority to regulate his conduct.
Such a regulation infringed upon the reserved police powers of the
state.'4 The Court's reasoning, in assuming a federal government of
limited and sharply defined powers, predated the more recent, ex-
pansive judicial interpretations of the powers granted the federal
government. 47 Some critics of the ICWA have suggested that the law
might be subject to a reserved power of the states or Tenth Amend-
ment challenge. 148 However, in light of the reluctance of the Supreme
Court since 1937 to enforce limits on the powers of the federal
government vis-a-vis the states, one should not assume this to be the
case. For example, the Court has now overruled even the relatively
140. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 13-14 (quoted at the outset of this Comment);
T~amE, supra note 28, at 1472. The existence of the case is acknowledged in H.R.
REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 20.
141. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
142. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
14:1. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
144. Heff, 197 U.S. at 499.
145. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 505-08.
147. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
148. For discussion, see H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 17-18; Linda
Marousek, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D. L.
REv. 98, at 106-108, 112 (1980).
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limited restraint of National League of Cities v. Usery, which created
a state autonomy barrier to congressional regulation. 49
But presumably a court could, if it wished, reach the same con-
clusion by holding that subjecting an individual to racially discrimi-
natory legislation would violate his Fifth Amendment rights. Boiling
invites such a result. 50 This conclusion may involve the additional
step of proving that the discrimination is adverse, rather than "be-
nign."'' Such a distinction potentially involves all the difficulties
associated with the affirmative action cases, including what consid-
eration a court should give to the rights of non-Indians affected by
the law, and how harmful and beneficial legislation are to be distin-
guished. For example, how would a court determine if enforced
abstinence from alcohol were harmful or beneficial to the individ-
ual? 52 While this area of the law remains uncertain, we can conclude
that an adverse discrimination against a member of a racial minority
group violates federal c6nstitutional guarantees."5 3
The Court reached a different conclusion from In re Heff con-
cerning the same legislation just eleven years later. In United States
v. Nice, 54 the Court reversed itself and decided that Congress had
in fact not intended to remove allotment recipients from the national
guardianship, at least until the expiration of the twenty-five year
trust period. 55 The Assistant Attorney General advocated this posi-
tion before the Court.5 6 Allottee Indians were once again forbidden
to purchase liquor. Moreover, subsequent congressional amendment
and executive orders have extended trust periods indefinitely. 7
The Court had displayed a deferential attitude toward prevailing
congressional policies two years earlier in United States v. San-
149. 426 U.S. 146 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
151. See Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977). But see Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
152. By way of comparison, the Supreme Court of Canada has held invalid the
conviction of a Canadian Indian for being intoxicated outside the boundaries of a
reserve, on the grounds that such a conviction violated the equal protection provision
of the Canadian Bill of Rights (Statutes of Canada, 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 44 (1960)
(Eng.)). The Queen v Drybones, 1970 S.C.R. 282 (Can.); see also A.G. Canada v.
Laval, 1974 S.C.R. 1349 (Can.) (upholding a provision of the Indian Act that
stipulated that an Indian woman who married a non-Indian lost her Indian status,
while an Indian man who married a non-Indian woman retained his Indian status);
A.G. Canada v. Canard, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 (Can.) (upholding special provisions
for the administration of estates of Indians living on reserves).
153. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
154. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
155. Id. at 599-600.
156. Id. at 592.
157. See 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1988) (and references following); id. § 462.
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doval.'58 In upholding a congressional ban on the sale of alcohol to
the Pueblo Indians, the Court stated:
Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring
a community or body of people within the range of this
power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe, but only
that in questions whether, to what extent, and for what
time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependant
tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the
United States are to be determined by Congress, and not
by the Courts.3 9
To all intents and purposes, the question of the eventual termination
of the special relationship between tribal Indians and the federal
government was placed within the political question doctrine, out of
bounds for judicial decision. 160
The Court set out the modern rule governing equal protection
analysis of national legislation on Indian affairs in Morton v. Man-
cari. 61 Non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
claimed that a hiring preference for Indians constituted invidious
racial discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. After
finding that the preference, dating from the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, had not been.implicitly repealed by the 1972 Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, the Court upheld the preference as a
valid exercise of the federal Indian power. The Court found a clean
solution in treating the classification as political, rather than racial:
[T]his preference does not constitute 'racial discrimina-
tion.' Indeed, it is not even a 'racial preference.' . . . The
preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a
discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-
158. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
159. Id. at 46.
160. See also Baker v. Carr, -369 U.S. 186, 215-17 (1961) (quoting Sandoval, 231
U.S. at 46, with approval); id. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("it is ordinarily
for Congress, not the Court, to determine whether or not a particular Indian group
retains the characteristics constitutionally requisite to confer the [congressional regu-
latory] power."). But note that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Baker
refer to the eventual termination of congressional power over tribal groups, and thus
should not necessarily be taken to mean that an individual's status as an Indian is
always relegated to the political question doctrine. United States v. Crook, 25 F. Cas.
695 (D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) remains good law. See supra text accompanying
notes 138-40.
161. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). See generally Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal,
Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587, 595-99 (1979) (discussing the
Morton decision).
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sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are gov-
erned by the BIA in a unique fashion. 62
And in fact, only members of federally recognized tribes were eligible
for the benefit. 63 Morton was an easy case, at least from the view-
point of Indian law, since tribal members were receiving an indis-
putable benefit. The result could even have been reached under
ordinary Regents v. Bakke or Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC rea-
soning.16 If an Indian challenged a different law as an adverse
discrimination, or if courts applied such a law to non-enrolled In-
dians, the Court could well reach a contrary result. The standard
articulated in Morton, however, was close to a rational basis test:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.
Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say
that Congress' classification violates due process. 65
The Court's language and general attitude matches that seen earlier,
in Sandoval and in Nice.
Two more recent decisions have answered some, though by no
means all, of the questions left unaddressed by Morton.6 6 Of par-
ticular interest is Fisher v. District Court, 67 an adoption case. Fisher
set up the rules that governed state-tribal jurisdictional disputes over
child-custody cases involving Indian children prior to the enactment
162. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553-54. The Court's statement that such legislation
"single[s] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near
reservations" may suggest a geographic limitation on the federal Indian power. Id.
at 552.
163. Id. at 553 n.24; cf. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 650 (1978) (the
Court finds unobjectionable a provision of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act
defining "Indians" to include "all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood");
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988).
164. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42 (1977) (summarizing and distinguishing Morton); see
also Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
165. Id. at 555. Two years later, Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73 (1976), provided some evidence that the Morton standard was more than
mere rational basis review. Although the Court upheld against an equal protection
challenge a law denying one group of Delaware Indians benefits that were distributed
to the remainder of the tribe, the Court stated that "[t]he power of Congress over
Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute" and examined the
issues at length. Id. at 84. Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 91; see Johnson & Crystal,
supra note 161, at 600-02.
166. See generally Johnson & Crystal, supra note 161, at 599-607.
167. 424 U.S. 382 (1975) (per curiam).
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of the ICWA. Applying the Williams v. Lee "infringement test"
(discussed in part I),161 the Court concluded that state jurisdiction
over "a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians"
would interfere with the tribe's powers of self-government.1 69
Fisher expressly rejected the argument that denying the plaintiff
access to state courts, under the particular facts of the case, consti-
tuted an impermissible racial discrimination. The Court justified this
result by relying on the quasi-sovereign status of the tribe. As in
Morton, this was a "political" rather than a racial classification.
The opinion went further by stating:
[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in
denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian
has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is jus-
tified because it is intended to benefit the class of which
he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of
Indian self-government. 70
Nevertheless, the facts in Fisher presented an easy case that did not
raise the more complicated questions. All parties, including both
parents and the child, were enrolled members of the tribe. Further,
the child resided and lived on the reservation. The difficult issues of
tribal control over non-members, of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
children not domiciled on the reservation, and of tribal jurisdiction
over parties lacking in minimum contacts with the tribal forum, were
all lacking.
The Court handed down another significant decision in United
States v. Antelope.'7 1 Two Coeur d'Alene Indians challenged their
murder conviction under the federal Major Crimes Act on the grounds
that they were subject to invidious racial discrimination, because, as
Indians, they were tried under felony murder standards which would
not have applied if they had been tried in the state courts. In
affirming their convictions, Chief Justice Warren Burger repeatedly
stressed that congressional legislation directed at tribal Indians did
not racially discriminate. 72 The judicial deference of the Mancari
168. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
169. Fisher, 424 U.S. at 387.
170. Id. at 390-91.
171. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). Between 1974 and 1977 two federal courts of appeals
found convictions of reservation Indians under more stringent federal criminal statutes
to be violative of equal protection, since non-Indians would not have been subject to
the provisions. United States v. Big Crow, 523 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
424 U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1974). These
cases have been cast in doubt by Antelope. No federal court of appeals has found a
federal regulation of Indian affairs to be in violation of equal protection since Big
Crow.
172. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 644-46.
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and Fisher decisions was not to be limited to legislation aimed at
promoting Indian self-government, but would apply to all federal
regulation of Indian affairs. 7 1
A footnote in the Antelope opinion, however, may say more than
the opinion itself. 7 4 Burger here drew attention to the fact that both
defendants were "enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and
were not emancipated from tribal relations," 17s and that the crimes
were committed within the confines of Indian Country. Chief Justice
Burger then noted that "enrollment in an official tribe has not been
held to be an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction, at least
where the Indian defendant lived on the reservation and 'maintained
tribal relations with the Indians thereon."1 7 6 The Court declined to
rule on the questions suggested in this footnote. Thus, the Court has
yet to directly address the issues most relevant in the context of the
ICWA. The Supreme Court has decided no significant Indian equal
protection cases since Antelope in 1976.'7
The only Supreme Court decision interpreting the ICWA, Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 78 dealt solely with the
definition of "domicile" in the context of a section 1911(a) exclusive
jurisdiction proceeding. Significantly, three judges dissented from
what would have seemed a relatively straightforward reading of the
statute's intent. The majority held that Indian parents could not
escape tribal jurisdiction simply by leaving the reservation just prior
to the birth of twins. Justice Steven's dissenting opinion stressed the
rights of the individual Indian parents, as against the interests of the
tribe. 79
Very few published opinions by any court deal with the constitu-
tional issues which the ICWA potentially raises. In In re Guardianship
173. Id. at 646.
174. Id. at 646 n.7.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citations omitted). The two decisions cited by the Court were examined
at length by the Department of Justice in its Feb. 9, 1978 letter to the House
committee. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 37-38. Only one case, Exparte
Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938), was believed to be significant. That case held that
a Indian (not enrolled as a tribal member) could not be convicted of an on-reservation
murder in state court, but only in federal court. Pero, 99 F.2d at 34-35. The
Department believed this to be distinguishable from the adoption situations.
177. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463 (1979); Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
Both cases mention equal protection but do not alter the standards of the Morton
and Fisher decisions.
178. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
179. Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("To preclude parents domiciled on a
reservation from deliberately invoking the adoption procedures of state court ...
distorts the delicate balance between individual rights and group rights recognized by
the ICWA.").
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of D.L.L. & C.L.L.,'8 0 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held
thai: the children of an Indian family residing on a reservation, where
each family member was enrolled in the tribe, were not denied due
process or equal protection by exclusive tribal jurisdiction under
section 1911(a). In In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,,
the Court of Appeals of Arizona likewise held that a child domiciled
on a reservation did not have his equal protection rights violated by
denying him access to state courts under the provisions of section
1911(a). And in Application of Angus,8 2 the Court of Appeals of
Oregon held that the application of the provisions of the ICWA
governing parental consent to adoptive care placements" 3 did not
violate the Fifth Amendment where both parents were enrolled mem-
bers. No published opinion has dealt with the constitutional issues
in depth or in difficult fact situations.
What rules can we derive from these cases? First, an ethnic Indian
who. is not an enrolled member of a tribe and does not live on or
near a reservation will not be subject to federal regulation of Indian
affairs. Such an individual should succeed in a due process or an
equal protection challenge if the statute even arguably harms that
individual. Second, an enrolled member living on or near a reserva-
tion will be subject to special regulation. This individual will not
have an equal protection remedy even if the statute appears to have
a slightly harmful effect: the courts will defer to the judgment of
Congress in the exercise of its federal guardianship responsibilities.
As for situations in between, however, the recent cases shed so little
light that we can only suggest legal and policy rationales for where
the line should be drawn.
B. The Jurisdictional Provisions of the ICWA
1. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) Exclusive Jurisdiction
The tribe has exclusive jurisdiction "over any child custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within
180. 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980) (relying on Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S. 535 (1974)).
181. 635 P.2d 187, 193 (Ariz. App. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Social
Servs. v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) ("The denial of access to state courts is based
upon the political status of the parent and child and the quasi-sovereign nature of
the tribe. This is a discriminatory classification which is not prohibited by the United
States Constitution.") (citing Fisher).
182. 655 P.2d 208, 213 (Or. App. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Woodruff v.
Angus, 464 U.S. 830 (relying on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)).
183. 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988).
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the reservation of such tribe."'1 The statute defines "Indian child"
as an unmarried person under eighteen who is "either (a) a member
of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.' '5
Section 1911(a) can be readily described as an ordinary "political"
jurisdictional boundary, thus insulating the section from any equal
protection challenge. It differs little from the fact situation expressly
approved in Fisher v. District Court,16 and does not represent a
significant change from the law as it existed before the 1978 act
passed - at least regarding states already using a domicile standard.18 7
For example, in Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston,18 8 a federal
district court held that Michigan could not exert jurisdiction over
three orphaned children, with an Indian father and non-Indian mother,
based only on presence when the children were domiciled on the
reservation.8 9 The court reasoned: "If tribal sovereignty is to have
any meaning at all in this juncture of history, it must necessarily
include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to
provide for the care and upbringing of its young, a sine qua non to
the preservation of its identity." 190 Citing past cases, the court held
that the domicile of the children followed that of the parent with
whom the children lived, and that the domicile of adults required
two elements: intent and physical presence.' 9'
On the other hand, prior to 1978 two states, Arizona and Montana,
used mere presence as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over Indian
children. 92 The decisions reaching this conclusion, In re Cantrell'93
184. Id. § 1911(a); see also id. § 1903(1) ("child custody proceeding" includes
actions concerning foster care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placements, and adoptive placements).
The "Baby Keetso" case, which received considerable media attention in April
1988, was a section 1911(a) proceeding. A California superior court (Santa Clara
County; Nichols, Judge) transferred jurisdiction to a Navajo tribal court after finding
that the child was legally domiciled on the reservation. See, e.g., Los ANoELEs Trs,
May 15, 1988, at 3, col. 1; Tnm, May 2, 1988, at 64; Statement of Violet Lui,
Attorney, the Navajo Nation (May 11, 1988), in 1988 Hearing, supra note 10, at 93.
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
186. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
187. For an overview of the jurisdictional law prior to 1978, see Mack T. Jones,
Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIZ. L. Rav. 1123, 1129-35
(1979). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 57-
59 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973); see also In re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079,
1080-81 (Or. App. 1975) (endorsing a domicile standard).
189. The children were enrolled members of the reservation.
190. Wisconsin Potowatomies, 393 F. Supp. at 730.
191. Id. at 732. See generally 25 AM. JuR. 2D Domicile § 1 (1966) (Definitions)
and cases cited therein.
192. Jones, supra note 187, at 1129.
193. 495 P.2d 179 (Mont. 1972).
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and In re Duryea,194 have now been superseded by the enactment of
the 1CWA. The exclusive jurisdiction portion of the ICWA adopts
the Wisconsin Potowatomies rule and makes it mandatory on all
states. 95
The Fisher decision involved a child domiciled on a reservation
where both the child and its parents were enrolled members. But
under the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the ICWA, either the
child or one of its parents might not be enrolled as a member.
Moreover, it is quite reasonable to expect that one of the parents
might not even be an Indian. A mixed blood child is still likely to
be eligible for membership under the provisions of a tribal consti-
tution. 96 Nevertheless, domicile remains a reasonable basis for juris-
diction, and is analogous to the standard that would govern in a
conventional interstate custody dispute. 1'
The child's parents, presumably, could still end tribal jurisdiction
simply by resigning their membership, and thus placing their child
outside the statute's definition of "Indian child."' 19 Unfortunately,
neither the statute nor the interpretive guidelines issued by the BIA
make this point clear. 99 The parents' ability to opt out of Indian
status remains crucial to the voluntary nature of the reservation
194. 563 P.2d 885 (Ariz. 1977).
195. While the opinion expressed here matches statements made by Justice Stevens
in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting), it is not meant to imply any disagreement with the result reached by
the majority opinion.
196. See WASHBuRN, supra note 68, at 163-64. The tribe has final word on
membership determinations under the Act. See Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines
for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,586
(Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter BIA Guidelines]. For an idea of the difficulties that can
be involved in a membership determination, see In re Junious M, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40,
43-46 (1933).
197. See generally Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisprudence Act, 96 A.L.R.3d 968 (1979). A minor point
about which there might be a question is the juxtaposition of "residence" with
"domicile" in the language of section 1911(a). While this might be read to imply that
a tribe could exert jurisdiction based on presence, such a reading is unlikely and
probably was not intended. See generally 25 Am. JuR. 2D Domicile § 4 (1966) (residence
defined). The issue receives no attention in either H.R. RP. No. 1386, supra note
17, or in the Department of Interior guidelines on the Act. See BIA Guidelines, supra
note 196.
198. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988) (Indian child defined).
199. The House Report to the 1978 Act stated that "[w]e do note that, for an
adult Indian, there is an absolute right of [expatriation] from one's tribe." H.R. REP.
No. 13116, supra note 17, at 20. But the BIA Guidelines state that "[t]he determination
by a tribe that a child is or is not a member of that tribe, is or is not eligible for
membership in that tribe, or that the biological parent is or is not a member of that
tribe is conclusive." BIA Guidelines, supra note 196, at 67,586.
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system, and should, if necessary, be understood as an explicit re-
quirement of equal protection. A reasonable construction of the
statute could probably solve this problem without the necessity of
reaching the constitutional questions. It is important to note that this
issue did not arise in the case recently decided by the Supreme Court,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.200 In Holyfield,
the parents never attempted to completely sever their tribal relation-
ship, but only to temporarily escape tribal jurisdiction.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) Transfer of Proceedings
Also potentially controversial is the section of the ICWA requiring
that, for Indian children not qualifying for exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion: "ITihe court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
shall transfer such proceedings to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent
objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent, or the
Indian custodian or the child's tribe .... "20, The definition of Indian
child is unchanged. Such a child may, as discussed before, be born
to a tribal member and a non-Indian. One can easily imagine a
situation where a child, not enrolled as a tribal member, not domiciled
on the reservation, perhaps living with a non-Indian parent, and
completely lacking in contacts with traditional Indian society, could
- theoretically - be subject to transfer of proceedings to tribal
court.
Fortunately, Congress built two safeguards into the ICWA: first,
the ICWA gives either parent the right to object and block transfer,
and second, a state court can find "good cause" to deny transfer.
Together, these provisions adequately safeguard individual rights and
save the section from most equal protection challenges.
Jurisdiction under the ICWA seems at first glance to have char-
acteristics of both territorial and federal subject matter jurisdiction.
But the Supreme Court has described the jurisdictional issues raised
by the state court Indian child custody cases to be subject matter
questions. 20 2 Presumably, Congress has the power to take any issue
concerning tribal Indians and assign it exclusively to either federal
200. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
201. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988). This section applies only to foster care and
termination of parental rights proceedings. But consider that over 75% of the 1.5
million Americans describing themselves as ethnic Indians live outside of any reser-
vation. In California, 96% of the "230,000 ethnic Indians live outside the reservation
system. Many of these individuals are presumably fully assimilated into non-Indian
society. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, VOL. 1, ch. D,
pt. 1, § A, tbl. 253 (Mar. 1984) (Detailed Population Characteristics, United States
Summary); id. vol. 1, ch. D, pt. 6, § 1, tbl. 194 (Nov. 1983) (California); id. vol. 2,
pt. 2, § 1, tbl. 2 (Jan. 1986) (American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts on Identified
Reservations and in the Historic Areas of Oklahoma (Excluding Urbanized Areas)).
202. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 383-84 (1976); See also In re
Durvea. 563 P.2d 585. 586 (Ariz. 1977)_
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or tribal court. 20 3 All that Congress needs is constitutional power
over the subject matter, which is, in effect, the individual Indian in
question. One might therefore assume that the traditional procedural
due process rules that apply to territorial jurisdiction do not apply
here. Real or implied consent, for example, normally remains an
adequate basis for a court to exert territorial jurisdiction 2 14 but not
for subject matter jurisdiction. If this were just a question of terri-
torial jurisdiction, then the parental consent option under section
1911(b) could itself provide an adequate jurisdictional basis for the
transfer of proceedings to tribal court.
On the other hand, subject matter jurisdiction only extends as far
as the delegated powers of the federal government. It would thus
seem necessary to investigate the limits of the federal power over
Indian affairs, at least as to ethnic Indians not enrolled as members
of officially recognized tribes. The Supreme Court previously en-
countered this question in Sandoval, in Nice, and in Morton. But
why not simply let the consent of the parent define the family's
Indian status, and thus serve as the basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion? Let the parent, by the consent option, decide if they are in
fact an "Indian" so as to fall within the federal Indian power. It is
unlikely that anyone lacking a tribal identification would be willing
to submit to tribal jurisdiction. While one can imagine the existence
of a conflict of interest between the parent and the child, if the
parent believed tribal courts would apply more lenient removal stan-
dards towards a neglectful or abusive parent, this possibility does
not seem sufficient to justify restricting the parent's jurisdictional
options. A parent's decision to live as a tribal Indian will inherently
have consequences for that parent's child. The section 1911(b) situ-
ation is not significantly distinguishable from this general case.
A requirement that the child have minimum contacts with the
forum tribe could, arguably, be read into the "good cause" exception
to section 1911(b). 20-While courts normally use "minimum contacts"
as a due process test for territorial jurisdiction,'2 6 they could use the
203. See Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S TnE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTE? 479 (3d ed.
1988). See, e.g., Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423 (1907) (recognizing Congress'
authority to establish legislative courts to determine questions of tribal membership
within Indian territory); Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 65 n.16 (1982).
204. See Unterweser Reederei v. Zapata, 407 U.S. 1 (1972); National Equip. Rental
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
205. See Jones, supra note 187, at 1139 n.144.
206. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it .uch that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."').
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test here as an alternative method for defining subject matter juris-
diction, at least as a matter of statutory construction if not of
constitutional law. A court would define an individual as "Indian"
only if he possessed some minimal relationship with a reservation,
such as membership or cultural ties. But the legislative history of the
statute suggests that Congress merely intended "good cause" to be
"a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens," 207 and the BIA
Guidelines28 stress problems such as reservations lacking a tribal
court, late transfer petitions, objections by a child over twelve, 20
and witnesses located away from the reservation. 210 In any event, the
parental consent provision by itself appears to be an adequate meas-
ure of the substantiality of the child's relationship with the tribe, at
least as to section 1911(b) transfers. The statute probably does not
need an additional safeguard.
C. Termination and Placement Rules in State Court
The ICWA does more than just transfer custody proceedings to
tribal court; it also sets up special rules to govern state court pro-
ceedings in situations in which the state retains jurisdiction over the
Indian child. These requirements potentially create more controversy
than the jurisdiction transfers because they impact a broader group
of individuals, some of whom will have only relatively insubstantial
connections to reservation societies.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(e) and (f) Evidentiary Standards
The ICWA only allows a state court to make foster care placements
if "clear and convincing evidence" exists that continued custody "is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. '211
The Act only allows termination of parental rights if "evidence
207. H.R. REp. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 21.
208. See BIA Guidelines, supra note 196, at 67,591 ("It is recommended that in
most cases state court judges not be called upon to determined [sic] whether or not
a child's contacts with a reservation are so limited that a case should not be transferred.
This may be a valid consideration since the shock of changing cultures may, in some
cases, be harmful to the child. This determination, however, can be made by the
parent, who has a veto over transfer to tribal court.").
209. The Department of Justice suggested that an older child's consent be made
a statutory requirement for transfer. This makes good sense as it goes directly to the
question of the child's status as an "Indian." See Letter from Assistant Attorney
General Patricia Wald to the Hon. Morris Udall (May 23, 1978), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 38, 40.
210. BIA Guidelines, supra note 196, at 67,591.
211. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1988).
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beyond a reasonable doubt" shows that continued parental custody
will cause such damage.2 2 In either case, the court must support its
decision by the testimony of "qualified expert witnesses. 21 3 These
provisions apply to all children meeting the jurisdictional definition
of "Indian child."
It is apparent that these provisions alter the standard of proof that
is required before the court can issue a placement or termination
order. 2 4 The idea is apparently to offset cultural bias on the part of
the state courts. In a substantial number of cases the effect, unfor-
tunately, is likely to be nothing more than simply requiring more
abuse or neglect before the court can take action. Neglect in particular
is not a yes-or-no determination to which a conventional evidentiary
standard may easily be applied, but is a more complex question of
degree.
Many of the children subject to these provisions were born to
biracial relationships and may have no meaningful contacts with the
reservation. For example, the existence of a father, enrolled as a
tribal member, who has never even seen his illegitimate child, might
be sufficient to invoke these provisions. 25 Several years ago the
California Court of Appeal applied the ICWA in In re Junious M.
v. Diana L. 216 In Junious M., the mother, part Filipino and part
Nooksack Indian, did not know whether or not she was a tribal
member, and apparently had never lived on the reservation. The
illegitimate child's father, part Indian and part black, did not par-
ticipate in the proceedings. The appellate court held itself required
to apply the Act, even though the trial court found that the eight-
year-old child "had developed no identification as an Indian.12 7 A
case note on In re Junious described it as a "serious flaw" that
courts should subject "children to whom Indian status is a complete
212. Id. § 1912(0.
213. The BIA Guidelines make it clear that this means an individual knowledgeable
about "prevailing social and cultural standards and child rearing standards within the
Indian child's tribe." BIA Guidelines, supra note 196, at 67,593.
214. "By imposing these standards, Congress has changed the rules of law with
respect to the placement of Indian children. A child may not be removed simply
because there is someone else willing to raise the child who is likely to do a better
job or that it would be 'in the best interests of the child' for him or her to live with
someone else.... It inust be shown that it is dangerous for the child to remain with
his or her present custodians." Id. at 67,593.
215. This problem is mitigated by the definition of "parent," which "does not
include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or estab-
lished. . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1988).
216. 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1983).
217. Id. at 46.
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fiction and who are indistinguishable from other inner city, poor
minorities" to standards designed to protect culturally differing child
rearing practices.2 8
The parental consent and "good cause" safeguards that were part
of section 1911(b) are not available here. As such, courts will subject
ethnic "Indian" children (often of a very low Indian blood content)
to differential treatment in state courts, without the consent of their
parents, in situations where the child may lack significant contacts
with a reservation, based solely on the fact that one of the biological
parents is (or was prior to death) a member of a recognized tribe.
Moreover, it is likely the child will not be an tribal member. The
child's domicile and residence will be in the state, not on a reser-
vation. In the more extreme situations, such a child cannot mean-
ingfully be said to be subject to special federal regulation pursuant
to the Indian affairs power. By default, courts should treat the section
1912 provisions - as applied to such individuals as racial discrimi-
nations properly subject to stringent judicial review.
The Department of Justice made essentially the same point in a
letter sent to the relevant House and Senate committees in 1978.219
The Department, however, relied on a state's rights theory: "It seems
to us that the Federal interest in the off-reservation context [discuss-
ing the reach of the Indian Commerce Clause] is so attenuated that
the Tenth Amendment and general principles of federalism preclude
the wholesale invasion of state power contemplated by section 102
[25 U.S.C. § 19121.' '220 A Tenth Amendment argument and an equal
protection argument may, as a practical matter, be the same thing.
Both depend on the assumption that Congress has gone beyond the
allowable scope of its power under the Indian Commerce Clause. As
discussed previously, this comment focuses on equal protection out
of a belief that the modern case law is more receptive to arguments
based on individual as opposed to states' rights.221
Defining exactly at what point this line is crossed is still a difficult
problem. Moreover, there is an alternative argument: that the courts
should defer to the congressional determination of who is an Indian,
as the Supreme Court did in United States v. Sandoval and United
States v. Nice. One response is that courts should apply the political
218. David Null, Case Note, In re Junious M.: The California Application of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 74, 74 (1984).
219. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to the Hon. Morris
Udall (May 23, 1978), reprinted in H.R. RP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 39-40.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. Keep in mind also that the
Department's letter was written after National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), but before Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 928
(1985).
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question doctrine, and judicial deference generally, only to the ques-
tion of the eventual termination of congressional power over Indian
tribes, not to questions involving the status of individual Indians.
United States v. Crook thus would remain good law. 222 Perhaps an
even stronger response, however, is that a law discriminating ad-
versely against a racial minority must be held unconstitutional if there
is to be any consistency with the great body of existing case law. If
this were merely a "benign" discrimination, as was the case in
Morton v. Mancari, a judicial review of the boundaries of the federal
Indian power might be less justifiable. But creating a special federal
standard of proof in abuse and neglect cases, designed to be more
stringent than the normal state standards, will likely result in harm
to any child who lacks sufficient ties with traditional Indian society
to make plausible a claim that the state court might be culturally
biased.223 The child must experience more abuse or neglect before the
state can take action.
While an equal protection challenge on behalf of such a child
should succeed, no such cases appear to have been brought over the
last decade. This may be because no party has an incentive to assert
an equal protection claim on behalf of the child: the parents' interests
lie directly contrary to the child's on the standard of proof question.
At the same time, any statutorily defined standard of proof probably
remains sufficiently vague that a trial court, sitting without a jury,
could effectively ignore it without being reversed on appeal. This
may well be what many courts do today, and might further explain
why relatively few problems have surfaced with these provisions.
Nevertheless, the ICWA should condition the operation of the
special standard of proof on the existence of some minimal relation-
ship between the child and the reservation; a relationship that should
include ongoing cultural or family ties substantial enough to make
the child more a product of Indian than non-Indian society.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 Placement Preferences
When a state court makes adoptive placements of Indian children,
the Act requires the court to prefer placements with the child's
extended family, with other members of the tribe, and with other
Indian families - in that order. 224 A similar provision exists for
foster care placements, although here the placement should also be
222. See supra notes 138, 160.
223. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that a child should not be
subject to adverse legal discrimination because of factors beyond the child's control.
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1967) (holding state discrimination against
illegitimate children unconstitutional).
224. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
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"within reasonable proximity to his or her home." ' In both cases
a "good cause" exception exists, and the child's tribe may substitute
an alternative placement list.2 6 Moreover, section 1915 provides that
"[w]here appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent
shall be considered. . . ."227 These provisions apply to all children
meeting the jurisdictional definition of "Indian child."
At the outset, courts could solve the over-inclusiveness problems
that plagued the standard of proof provisions in section 1912 via
either the good cause exception or the parental preference provision.
However, it is clear from the BIA Guidelines that Congress did not
intend the BIA Guidelines' section 1915 good cause provision to serve
as a judicially imposed limitation on the definition of an Indian
child. The court should generally confine itself to more mundane
considerations. 2 8 At the same time, the Guidelines do suggest that a
request from the parents or an older child not to follow the placement
order should be sufficient to constitute good cause.2 9 But the legis-
lative history states that the parent's request "is not meant to out-
weigh the basic right of the child as an Indian. ' 230 If the parents or
older child gehuinely have the right to opt-out of the placement
preferences, the statute would be free from most of the problems
associated with the inclusion of children who are not meaningfully
"Indian."
Even assuming that children who do not legitimately come within
the congressional power over Indian affairs are covered by the place-
ment preferences, however, these children do not obviously have an
equal protection claim.? In comparison with the standard of proof
provisions, it is less apparent that an affected child is being harmed.
For example, placing a child in a similar racial or cultural environ-
ment is a common procedure in adoptions.23 2 Although neither the
225. Id. § 1915(b).
226. Id. § 1915(c).
227. Id.
228. BIA Guidelines, supra note 196, at 67,594 ("The request of the biological
parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age.... The extraordinary physical
or emotional needs of the child .... The unavailability of suitable families for
placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the pref-
erence criteria.").
229. Id. At the same time, the BIA Guidelines recommend that any party urging
that an exception be made bear the burden of proof that such an exception is necessary.
230. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 24.
231. Of course, the state would still be able to argue that its reserved powers were
infringed. This was the position of the Department of Justice as to these provisions.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to the Hon. Morris Udall (May
23, 1978), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 17, at 40-41.
232. Testimony of the National Committee for Adoption, William L. Pierce, Ph.D.
(May 11, 1988), in 1988 Hearing, supra note 10, at 184. But see Foster Placement by
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Supreme Court nor the federal courts of appeal have ever ruled
directly on this issue, there is good reason to expect that the Court
would treat such racial preferences as a non-objectionable, "benign"
discrimination.
The most closely related Supreme Court case, Palmore v. Sidoti,2"1
can readily be distinguished. Palmore forbade the removal of a child
frora the custody of its natural mother when she remarried a man
of another race: "[t]he effects of racial prejudice, however real,
cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from
the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person
to have such custody."1234 Section 1915 concerns a placement, rather
than a removal, and assumes not that the child will be subject to
racial prejudice in a different racial and cultural setting, but that the
child will adapt more easily to a biologically and culturally matching
family. Additionally, of course, Congress designed the Act to preserve
the existence of autonomous Indian tribes.
This is not to say that it would make any particular sense to place
an urban, multiracial "Indian" child with a traditional Indian family.
Rather, the problems with such a placement simply may not rise to
the level of an equal protection violation, at least from the viewpoint
of the child. If it could be demonstrated that the placement rules
harmed a child, however, one might still make an equal protection
case on the child's behalf.
A parent might succeed with an equal protection challenge made
on their own behalf, rather than on behalf of the child, but the point
remains tenuous. Once a court orders a final termination of parental
rights it is doubtful that the parents still have standing to sue. The
parents certainly retain their rights during a temporary foster care
placement, but the state also assumes an interest in the well-being of
the child. Presumably, the court removed the child because of the
abuse or neglect of the parents. At the same time, it seems unsatis-
factory that the child would be placed in an Indian home if that
were directly contrary to the preference of the parents.
The placement preferences are similar to several other procedural
requirements imposed by the ICWA. For example, the Act requires
Skin Tone Seen: A.C.L. U. Says New York City Sorts Children by Shade for Private
Agencies, N.Y. TmEs, Jan. 18, 1990, at A18 (alleging that New York inappropriately
uses rzce as a criterion in sending children to private foster-care agencies). At the
same time, note that the situation suggested in the text (same culture matching) is the
opposite of the situation that arises where a culturally or racially non-Indian child is
placed with a traditional Indian family.
233. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
234. Id. at 434.
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that notice be given to the child's tribe,235 and that the tribe have
the right to intervene at any point in the proceedings. 236 The parent
of a child lacking sufficient contacts with traditional Indian society
to qualify as a true "Indian," and hence arguably outside the reach
of the congressional power over Indian affairs, might find it worth-
while to challenge the constitutionality of any of these procedural
mechanisms if they could demonstrate some harm to the child or
family.
III. Senate Bill 1976: The Proposed Amendments
The ICWA undertakes a difficult balancing of individual rights
and tribal interests, and at times operates close to the line that divides
a legitimate exercise of the federal power over Indian affairs from
the constitutional protections of an individual from racial discrimi-
nation. This comment has argued that in some fact situations the
original legislation already crosses that line. Congress may believe it
necessary to push the constitutional limits of federal power in order
to deal with a crisis situation in the Indian family. Unfortunately,
the amendments Senator Evans proposed in the 100th Congress go
beyond anything that could reasonably be required to correct abuses
by state courts, and perhaps appropriately, if bluntly, have been
described by former Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel as "pure
racism.12 7 Part III of this comment briefly examines the more
235. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
236. Id. § 1911(c).
237. This label was applied by the former Secretary in a letter sent to the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs in May 1988. His objections centered around
jurisdictional provisions that compelled ethnic Indians, with little or no contact with
the reservation, to submit to tribal courts. Letter from Secretary of the Interior
Donald Hodel to the Hon. Daniel Inouye (May 11, 1988), in 1988 Hearings, supra
note 10, at 113. The Secretary's argument follows:
First. The bill is anathema to the salutary constitutional principle that
legislation cannot stand if it makes classifications and distinctions based
on race. If enacted, this bill would subject certain Indian children to the
claim of jurisdiction of an Indian tribe solely by reason of the children's
race. For example, under Section 101(b) of the bill, if a tribe seeks
transfer of a child custody or adoption case from the state court to the
tribe, the parents' objection to such transfer will be unavailing unless
the objection is "determined to be consistent with the best interests of
the child as an Indian .. . ." (emphasis added). The provision ignores
all other aspects of the child's status as a human being. That, in my
view, is pure racism.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to protect
the rights of the individual against classifications based on the indivi-
dual's race. This bill cannot be reconciled with that guiding principle.
It is not enough to say "but, this is 'Indian legislation."' Indians are,
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significant of the proposed changes in light of the discussion of equal
protection standards contained in part II.
A. The Jurisdictional Provisions of Senate Bill 1976
1. Section 101(a) Exclusive Jurisdiction
As in the ICWA, the proposed amendments would give the tribal
court exclusive jurisdiction where the Indian child resides or is dom-
iciled on the reservation. The significant changes are in the definitions
of "Indian child" and "child custody proceeding;" changes which
are applicable in other portions of the bill. An "Indian child" would
now include any unmarried person under eighteen who is a member
of the tribe, or is eligible for membership in the tribe, or is of
"Indian descent and is considered by an Indian tribe to be part of
its community. '"23 Moreover, "if a child is an infant he or she is
considered to be part of a tribal community if either parent is so
considered. ' 239 The definition of "[cihild custody proceeding" would
now embrace "an Indian child regardless of whether the child has
previously lived in Indian country, in an Indian cultural environment
or with an Indian parent. "240
Obviously, neither the child nor either of its parents need be an
enrolled member of the tribe for these definitions to apply. Under
the ICWA, at least one of the biological parents has to be an actual
member before the provisions of the Act apply. But under the
proposed amendments, the tribe need only claim that it considers
one of the parents to be "part of its community." At least theoret-
ically, any ethnic Indian in the country could meet these definitions.
and certainly should be, entitled to the basic protections of the Consti-
tution even when those protections would be denied by "Indian legis-
lation" See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S.Ct. 2076 (1987) (Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
Id. The Washington Post, in its editorial columns, endorsed the Secretary's views.
Editorial, WAsH. PosT, May 22, 1988, at C6. Senator Inouye, the Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, apparently did not agree with either
Secretary Hodel or the Post. Consider, for example, one of the questions he asked
Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, during the latter's congressional
testimony:
THE CHAIRMAN. The clear conclusion that I have reached from your
statement is that this is a bad, bad bill and that "the bill should not be
enacted." Now, having said that, am I correct to conclude that you
believe the present law is sufficient, proper, non-racist, and American?
Testimony of Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (May 11, 1988),
in 1988 Hearing, supra note 10, at 58.
238. S. 1976, § 4(5).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 4(1).
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There is hardly more than a pretense that this classification is polit-
ical, rather than racial. The Supreme Court used the rational basis
test in Morton v. Mancari on the assumption that Indians would be
regulated "not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities." 241 Such reasoning could not properly
be applied to Senator Evan's proposal.
Admittedly, the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of section 101(a)
represent a less serious problem than other portions of the bill, since
either residence or domicile on the reservation would be required.
But the parent appears to have lost the option of resigning his or
her membership as a final method for escaping tribal authority. 2
The parent might attempt to resign, but the tribal authorities could
still claim that that person was "considered to be part of a tribal
community" and hence still an "Indian" for purposes of the ICWA.
Any provision that subjects an adult individual, an American citizen,
to tribal jurisdiction should ultimately be traceable to the consent of
that individual. Although in the interstate context domicile may be
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, tribal jurisdiction over child custody
matters should require something more. Without some form of gen-
uine consent, the very existence of Indian reservations could become
a form a racial discrimination. In this situation, unless at least one
of the parents is presently an actual member, an equal protection
challenge on behalf of the parent should succeed. 243
2. Section 101(b) Transfer of Proceedings
The problems with the section 101(b) transfer of jurisdiction pro-
visions are more serious, and if enacted would unquestionably result
in a violation of equal protection rights when applied in some fact
situations. The same all-inclusive definitions of Indian child and child
custody proceedings apply under section 101(b), but, contrary to the
situation under section 101(a), the families affected will not reside
or be domiciled on the reservation. Nor need the family reside
anywhere near the reservation. In fact, most of the individuals who
would qualify for transfer of jurisdiction probably live in Los An-
geles, New York, or other major urban centers - hundreds or
thousands of miles from the reservation.
The state court "shall transfer" the custody proceedings to tribal
court "absent an unrevoked objection by either parent determined
241. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
242. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
243. This view is in accord with that expressed by the Department of Justice in
1978, and is one of the questions that the Supreme Court expressly refused to address
in footnote 7 of United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977). See supra
text accompanying note 176.
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to be consistent with the best interests of the child as an Indian"
upon the request of either parent, an "Indian custodian," or the
child's tribe. 2" Not only do the proposed amendments expand the
coverage of the Act by the change in the definition of an Indian
child., but the parents' option of not consenting to transfer is, to all
intents and purposes, taken away.
The consent provision in the original Act serves as a method by
which the parents can define themselves as Indian, so as to be
properly subject to the federal power over Indian affairs and to tribal
jurisdiction.243 The addition of the caveat that the objection must be
consistent with "the best interests of the child as an Indian" destroys
this function of the consent requirement. Some sort of limitation
along these lines should be constitutionally required if the transfer
to tribal court is not to constitute an impermissible denial of access
to state court on the basis of race.
The "good cause" provision in section 1911(b) of the ICWA has
the potential of serving as a second constitutional safeguard - if
the state court were allowed to find that a lack of significant contacts
on the part of the child with the reservation constituted good cause
not to transfer.2 A6 The possibility of such an exercise of discretion
under the statute by the trial court would be entirely foreclosed by
the elimination of the good cause provision from Senate Bill 1976.
Under Senator Evan's bill, there is nothing to stop any ethnic Indian
in the country from being forced involuntarily into tribal jurisdiction,
except the right of the tribe itself to decline the transfer.
It seems beyond question that an equal protection challenge to
section 101(b) by an adversely affected parent or child (who is not
an enrolled member of a reservation) 247 should succeed. Such a
challenge could be brought on behalf of either the child or its parents.
Moreover, the parent would have an unusually strong claim as the
Supreme Court has in the past described the right "to conceive and
raise one's children" as "essential," among "the basis civil rights of
man," and "far more precious than property rights. '24 The decision
that contained this language, Stanley v. Illinois,249 held that a father
was "entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his
children were taken from him," and that denying him the procedural
rights which were available to other similarly situated parents violated
244. S. 1976, § 101(b) (emphasis added).
245. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
247. Arguably, an enrolled member should be required to at least attempt to resign
his or her tribal membership before resorting to the expedient of an equal protection
claim to escape tribal jurisdiction.
248. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971).
249. Id.
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his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
Courts should subject section 101(b), involving both a fundamental
right and the most suspect of categories, race, to strict judicial
scrutiny, even though it involves congressional regulation of ethnic
Indians.
While section 1911(b) of the ICWA only covers foster care place-
ment and termination of parental rights proceedings, section 101(b)
would also cover voluntary adoptions. 25' Transfer or even just tribal
intervention in a voluntary proceeding potentially represents a greater
infringement on the rights of the parent than would be the case with
involuntary removals. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to
justify such an infringement as intended to offset a supposed bias
an the part of state courts. The overinclusiveness problem once again
creates constitutional difficulties: this provision should be limited to
those who genuinely fall within the scope of the federal power over
Indian affairs. And as a matter of policy, if not of constitutional
law, even enrolled members should be given the right to decline
transfer to tribal court.
B. Termination and Placement Rules in State Court
1. Section 102 Evidentiary Standards
The only changes made specifically to the standard of proof pro-
visions are aimed making it yet more difficult to remove children.
For example, "[e]vidence that shows only the existence of family
poverty, crowded or inadequate housing, alcohol abuse, or non-
conforming social behavior" would not adequately justify a tempo-
rary or permanent removal unless it establishes a "direct causal
relationship between particular conditions and the serious emotional
or physical damage that is likely to result. ' 252 While the ICWA
requires the court to "provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs" prior to ordering a placement,2 3 these efforts would now
have to be "culturally appropriate" and involve the child's tribe and
off-reservation Indian organizations. 25 4
None of these requirements would create an equal protection prob-
lem if Congress limited their application to families properly falling
within Congress' authority over Indian affairs. Congress may legiti-
mately believe that the special situation of reservation Indians requires
modified placement and termination standards. As discussed and
250. Id. at 649.
251. See generally S. 1976 § 103 ("Voluntary Proceedings").
252. Id. § 102(g).
253. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988).
254. S. 1976 § 102(d).
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argued before, however, congressional authority does not embrace
all ethnic Indians, but only those Indians possessing at least some
minimal contacts with the reservation or traditional Indian society.
The regulations could define the necessary contacts in terms of
membership; residence or domicile on or near the reservation; specific
consent; or perhaps even just substantial cultural ties. But Senate
Bill 1976 has not made an adequate effort to establish such contacts
as a condition to the operation of the proposed section 102. Instead,
as mentioned previously, the bill broadens the definition of "Indian
child" on which the section operates. As a constitutional matter,
implementing section 102 is a step in the wrong direction.
In terms of policy, section 102 would further harm non-traditional
ethnic Indian children by requiring yet more abuse or neglect before
coun:s can remove children from their parents. Whether section 102
would help or harm children from traditional Indian families is a
more difficult question. If Congress is correct in its assessment that
such children are being needlessly removed from parental custody
because of cultural bias in the state courts, then these adjustments
to the standard of proof could well offset that bias and reduce the
problem. However, the answer to this question is not directly relevant
to the equal protection analysis presented in this comment, since this
analysis only seeks to identify those families who do not politically
or culturally qualify as tribal Indians, and who thus should not be
included within special Indian legislation.
2. Section 105 Placement Preferences
At the outset, section 105 makes clear the intent of the placement
preferences in the proposed amendments: "All placements of Indian
children shall seek to protect the right of Indian children as Indians
and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in having its
children in its society." 255 Apparently, throughout Senate Bill 1976
and to a significantly greater extent than in the present Act, the first
and primary goal is to preserve the existence of a separate Indian
society within the United States. The "Declaration of Policy" at the
outset of Senate Bill 1976, for example, concludes with the following
statement: "Congress hereby declares its intent to protect the right
of Indian children to develop a tribal identity and to maintain ties
to the Indian community within a family where their Indian identity
will be nurtured." ' -6 Moreover, it would seem that the sponsors of
Senate Bill 1976 intend this principle to apply to all ethnic Indian
255. Id. § 105(a).
256. Id. § 3.
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children, not just those who actually hold membership in tribes or
live on reservations.
The proposed section 105, for example, contains the same man-
datory preferences for placements with Indian families as does section
1915 of the ICWA. The significant changes, aside from the increase
in coverage caused by the expansion of the definition "Indian child,"
lie in the unequivocal rejection of the right of the parent to opt-out
of the preference scheme, and in the elimination of the section 1915
good cause exception. Under Senate Bill 1976, a preference expressed
by the parent "shall be considered so long as the placement is made
with one of the persons or institutions listed in subsections (b) or
(C)." ' 257 In other words, only so long as the parents' prefer to place
the child in an Indian environment. While the bill eliminates the
good cause provision, it does allow a waiver of the preferences if a
child of twelve or older objects or if suitable families cannot be
found after "diligent search. ' 258 However, thege provisions do not
permit courts to violate the "rights of the Indian community and
tribe in having its children in its society. ' 259 Any loopholes that might
have allowed a state court to get out from under section 1915 have
effectively been closed.
In practice, these changes may be less significant if only because
the existing Act allows state courts very little room to maneuver on
the good cause and parental objection provisions as it is. Nevertheless,
the proposed changes, questionable as a matter of policy, dramatize
the need to confine the reach of such provisions to traditional,
reservation-oriented Indians. It is the expansion in the definition of
"Indian child" that ultimately causes the most concern, and that
most severely accentuates the equal protection objections to the ex-
isting legislation.
Conclusion
Judicial recognition of a special federal power over Indian affairs
is an admission that such regulation involves political judgments that
courts generally cannot second-guess. At the same time, federal and
state courts still have a responsibility to interpret the Constitution
and to protect ethnic Indians as well as other groups from racially
discriminatory legislation. Ultimately, we should not allow federal
Indian regulation to cross this line.
Either Congress or the courts must ultimately define those Indians
who come within the special regulation of Indian affairs in terms of
their consent to that relationship. Voluntarily assumed and freely
relinquishable membership in a tribe is the most obvious test. For
257. Id. § 105(e).
258. Id. § 105(c).
259. Id. 6 105(a).
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individuals living on or near a reservation, actual membership need
not be an absolute requirement, so long as the individual consents
in some way to the special treatment. For individuals living at a
distance from the reservation, membership alone may not always be
sufficient. Ideally, the off-reservation individual should specifically
consent to the application of each particular piece of legislation.
While the existing ICWA predominantly concerns itself with the
well being of Indian children and makes a sincere effort to balance
individual rights and tribal interests, it nevertheless is potentially
subject to an equal protection challenge in its standard of proof
requirements, and very likely in its placement preferences as well.
But where the ICWA legitimately expresses a congressional policy of
promoting tribal self-determination and autonomy, the proposed
amendments carry this policy almost to the point of involuntarily
segregating ethnic Indians from the rest of American society. It is at
this point that constitutional limitations should apply.
In. most situations within the scope of this Comment, equal pro-
tection need only require that special congressional regulation of
Indian affairs be based, either directly or indirectly, on the consent
of the individuals concerned. Applying the special evidentiary stan-
dards for foster care placement and termination of parental rights
proceedings in state courts is a potential exception, 260 requiring some-
thing more because of the incentive potentially created for the parent
to opt-in and take advantage of the more stringent removal standards.
Here, the law should appropriately require some additional minimal
relationship to the reservation or traditional Indian society.
260. Id. § 102; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(e) & (f) (1988).
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